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Organ Transplantation With an
Incompetent Donor: Kentucky
Resolves the Dilemma of
Strunk v. Strunk
By J E C. SAvAGE*
There is in fact a true law-namely, right reason-which is
in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is un-
changeable and eternal.'
Time Magazine called it a "Solomonic decision, but not with-
out severe debate."2 The London Daily Mirror reported it as a
case where "brotherly love . . . triumphed in a life or death
battle with the law."3 The Law Week Summary and Analysis of
Current Law emphasized that the case was one containing "the
basic question of a court's power to invade the body of one
person for the benefit of another."4 The Louisville Courier-
Journal stated it was a "carefully limiting decision."5 Judge Earl
T. Osborne, in the majority opinion in the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, stated, "We are fully cognizant of the fact that the ques-
tion before us is unique."6 Judge Samuel Steinfield, in the dis-
senting opinion, stated, "... I have been more troubled in reach-
ing a decision in this case than in any other."7 And for this writer,
*B.A., University of Oklahoma (1961); LL.B., University of Kentucky
(1964); LL.M. Harvard University (1965); Adjunct Instructor of Law, Univer-
sity of Kentucky College of Law; Adjunct Instructor of Pathology, University of
Kentucky College of Medicine; Member of the Firm, Turley, Tackett, Savage
& Moore, Lexington, Kentucky; Attorney for Petitioner, Strunl v. Strunlc, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
iM. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, III, xxii (Sabine & Smith translation).2 TndE, Nov. 7, 1969, at 54.
3 London Daily Mirror, Nov. 20, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
4 38 U.S.L.W. 1049 (Oct. 7, 1969).5 The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), Sept. 27, 1969, § A, at 1,
col. 1.
6 Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 147, (Ky. 1969).
" Id. at 149.
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who was the attorney for the family involved, the case was most
unique and challenging.
The case was Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969),
and the issue presented in the case: Does a court of equity have
the power to permit a kidney to be removed from an incompetent
ward of the state upon petition of his committee, who is also his
mother, for the purpose of being transplanted into the body of
his brother, who is dying of a fatal kidney disease? The Court of
Appeals, by a four-three decision, held that it did.
Seldom in Kentucky law has a case stirred the passions of
legal minds as much as Strunk. For those in favor of the trans-
plant, the question was simple. Would the incompetent rather
have a brother or a kidney? The relatively inconsequential risk
to the incompetent donor compared to the life-saving potential
to the recipient makes for an extremely compelling argument.
For those opposed to the transplant, the case conjured up
thoughts of experimentation on human subjects incapable of
understanding the nature of the proceedings, reminiscent of a
society now some twenty-five years removed from the face of this
earth wherein such procedures were performed to the shock and
dismay of an entire world. The first sentence of the dissenting
opinion sums up this reaction.
Apparently because of my indelible recollection of a govern-
ment which, to the everlasting shame of its citizens, embarked
upon a program of genocide and experimentation with human
bodies I have been more troubled in reaching a decision in
this case than in any other.8
It is the purpose of this article to discuss Strunk in detail,
reporting the relevant facts of the case and discussing the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions of the Court of Appeals. I also hope
to make a reasonable appraisal of the legal implications of the
case. But first, a brief discussion of the medical and legal back-
ground against which this case arose is presented.
CURRENT STATUS OF MEDICINE.
In transplantation, as in most all areas of medicine, progress
has been amazing. The impossible of yesterday has become the
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reality of today. Even so, the practice is in its infancy, and the
real practical health benefits which transplantation makes pos-
sible are as yet not fully realized.'
There are four types of transplants:
1. Autografts-The transplanting of tissues within the same
person-for example, a skin graft from one area of the body to
another. The success rate with such transplants is higher than
with any other because there is no rejection of the transplanted
tissue.
2. Isografts-The transplanting of tissue between identical
twins, e.g. a kidney transplant. 0
3. Homografts-The transplanting of tissues between persons.
The more common transplants have involved blood, skin, cornea,
cartilage, tendon, bone, and kidney. Although less frequent,
there recently have been transplants of the pancreas, thymus,
liver, lung, stomach, intestine, duodenum, and more dramatically,
the heart." Various degrees of success have been reported. The
main medical problem is the natural tendency of the body to
reject foreign matter.
4. Heterografts-The transplanting of tissues from an animal
to a person. This has the least degree of success at present be-
cause this method has the greatest degree of rejection of the
transplanted tissue and immunological reaction in the recipient.
As research develops, however, this could become the most
promising type of transplant because it would remove many legal
problems.
Transplantation opens up fantastic medical possibilities for
enriching and expanding human life. Like an old and defective
automobile that needs new parts, the human body could pick up
fresh replacements and go on "running." The life-saving potential
is staggering. Approximately 6,000 to 10,000 persons per year, in
this country alone, could be saved by a successful kidney trans-
plant.12 Many thousands more die of coronary artery disease,
and could be saved by a successful heart transplant. As medical
9 For an interesting and informative discussion of this topic, see Note,
Law and Life: Organ Transplants, 20 S. CAn. L. REv. 765 (1968).
30 The first kidney transplant was performed on identical twins in 1954.
11Ford, Human Organ Transplantation, 15 CA-m. LAw. 136 (1969).




science progresses and these transplants, particularly the homo-
graft variety, become more successful, the demand for such
transplants will mushroom.
The amazing thing to realize is that the difficulty in per-
forming all these transplants will not lie with inadequate supply.
Given 50,000 plus highway deaths each year, there should be an
abundance of transplantable organs. The problem will lie with the
shortage of trained medical personnel and medical facilities, and
with outdated and restrictive laws.
CuuirNT STATus OF LAW.
While much has been written in the last few years concern-
ing the need for law to develop in this area, little development
has occurred.13 There is still very little case law and, with the
exception of the passage in several states of the Uniform An-
atomical Gift Act,'4 which will subsequently be discussed, very
little comprehensive statutory law. In effect, then, society is at-
tempting to solve questions of vital importance by reference to
statutes and case law never intended to apply.
The legal issues involved are best classified as follows:
1. Legal Implications Concerning the Donor.




B. The Deceased Donor.
2. Legal Implications Concerning the Recipient.
13 Berman, The Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 13 VL. L. REv.
751 (1968); Finesilver, Organ Transplants: A Multi-Discipline Challenge, 5
TA.ALA 40 (1969); Ford supra note 11- Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance
and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
357 (1967-68); Stickel, Organ Transplantation in Medical and Legal Perspec-
tives, 32 LAw & CoNTrnm. PROB. 597 (1967); Note, Law and Life: Organ
Transplants, 20 S. CARs. L. REv. 765 (1968); Note, Organ Transplantation and
the Donation: A Proposal for Legislation, 10 Wm. & MtAY L. REv. 975 (1969).14 Tim UnomM ANATOimCAL GIFr AcT (1968). The Act was approved
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 25, 1968. HANDBooK oF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMIassSroNaRS oN UnFomR STATES LA Ws 95-96
(1968). The full text of the AQt is set forth in the Appendix to this article.
[Vol. 58
ORGAN TRANPLANTATioN
Legal Implications Concerning the Donor.
A. The Live Donor.
With the live donor, the main legal problem is consent. It is,
of course, axiomatic that any non-emergency medical procedure
performed will result in an assault and battery for which the
surgeon will be liable unless a voluntary, informed consent is
obtained from the patient. Such consent requires the doctor to
explain to his patient the procedure to be performed, with its
attendant risks, and the patient must actually understand and
consent. If he does not understand, or if he is coerced into
making the decision, then he has not had the opportunity to
make a rational choice of whether to proceed. 5
I. The Adult.
There has been little or no problem in transplantation with
the competent, adult donor. After having the donation and its
consequences explained, the adult need only sign the consent
form and the surgeons may proceed.
Some writers, however, have questioned whether a person
can make a rational decision to donate a part of his body in
such an emotionally charged situation. With the life of a family
member usually hanging in the balance, it is contended, the
donor is too pressured. He must rush to the aide of his stricken
loved one, or he must face the scorn of his family and friends.'6
Frequently, the decision to submit to any medical procedure
is made under less than calm or reflective circumstances. Be-
sides, the doctrine of informed consent reflects a fundamental
principal in law that the competent adult should have the right
to determine what medical procedures will be performed on
his person. Such freedom of choice should include the right to
decide whether to donate a part of his body as well as the right
to decide whether to undergo any other type of procedure.
Where the donor falls short of being a competent adult, the
problem of consent is greatly magnified. This would be the case
15 The first case on informed consent in Kentucky was Tabor v. Scobee, 254
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1952). The most recent case is Haywood v. Allen, 406 S.W.2d
721 (Ky. 1966).
3.6 Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 13, at 389; Stickel, supra note 13, at 603.
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should a minor, or an incompetent, become a prospective donor.17
It is interesting to note that prisoner volunteers were used as
kidney donors in Denver, but this practice was soon discontinued
because of the consent problem despite considerable experience
which demonstrated unique medical and scientific advantages in
their use. While there was no question that these prisoners were
competent adults, it was argued that they were making these
donations under the impression, whether real or imagined, that
their actions would result in some form of leniency, such as an
earlier parole. The reason given for the discontinuance of the
practice was that the use of prisoners, however properly handled,
was deemed inevitably to lead to abuse if accepted as a reason-
able precedent and applied broadly.18
2. The Minor.
Case law has generally held that a minor cannot, by himself,
give a valid consent, and that the physician who proceeds with-
out obtaining the consent of the minor's parent or guardian is
committing assault and battery.9
The drafters of the original Restatement of Torts2" indi-
cated that where a minor is old enough to understand the at-
tendant risk, the physician may proceed without obtaining the
consent of the minor's parent or guardian. This proposition, how-
ever, did not receive wide support and was dropped by the
drafters of the Restatement Second. 2' As a practical matter,
what physician is going to proceed with only the minor's con-
sent, trusting that the minor is old enough to understand and
that this decision will later be made in a court of law after the
physician has been sued?
There are no reported cases on the issue of consent of a minor
17 By a competent adult, I mean one who has not been adjudged incompetent
in a court of law, and one who has reached the age of majority under the law
of the state where he resides. Thus, in Kentucky, one would be a competent
adult if he were eighteen or over, and had not been adjudged incompetent pur-
suant to Kentucky's statute on incompetency, Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter KRS]
§ 2.015 (1968); KRS § 203.010 (1962) et seq.
18 Stickel, supra note 13, at 603-04.
19 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See Annot., 139 A.L.R.
1370 (1942).2 0 BESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59, comment a (1934).2 1 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 59 (1964).
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donor in a proposed transplant. There were, however, three un-
reported declaratory judgment proceedings in the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, all decided in 1957.22
In each of these cases, one identical twin was suffering from
kidney disease which would prove fatal if a kidney were not trans-
planted from the healthy identical twin. The Peter Bent Brig-
ham Hospital, Boston, was therefore faced with the very real
problem of whether to proceed with such a transplant in view
of the fact that the twins were all minors. The physicians ob-
tained the consent of the parents to proceed, but wondered
whether such consent was sufficient, and filed declaratory judg-
ment actions in the Supreme Judicial Court.
The first and most important case involved twins who were
nineteen years of age. The Court conducted a full hearing on
the matter, obtaining testimony not only from the parents, but
also from both twins, as well as the medical staff. Attorneys
for the parties were present.
The Court was particularly concerned with the question of
"benefit" to the healthy donor. Even with parental consent, the
Court reasoned, medical procedures should not be performed
on a minor unless they are reasonably necessary for his physical
or mental health. Concerning this issue, a psychiatrist, who had
interviewed both twins, testified that if the operation were not
performed, and the sick twin were to die, the healthy twin
would suffer a "grave, emotional impact."
The Court held that the surgeons and the hospital could
proceed. They found that the operation was necessary in order
that the sick twin survive, that the healthy twin had been fully
informed and understood the nature of the operation and its
consequences and had consented to it, and that there would be a
grave emotional impact upon the healthy twin if the surgery
were not performed and the sick twin were to die. This evidently
was sufficient "benefit" for the donor so that the transplant
could be performed.
2 2 Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957);
Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); Masden
v. Harrison, No. 68651 Eq. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957); For further
discussion of these cases, see Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplan-
tation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. Bv. 891 (1959).
1970]
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The other two cases were quite similar. In both there was a
hearing, all parties were present and testified, and there was
psychiatric testimony concerning the "benefit" to the donor.3
The twins were younger in these cases, however, being fourteen.
The Court was very careful to note that, despite this age of
fourteen, the minors did understand the nature of the proceed-
ings and consented.
Thus in all three of these Massachusetts cases, the Court
established the following criteria:
1. The parents must consent as in any medical procedure on
a minor;
2. The minor donor must understand the consequences of
his donation, and give his informed consent, even though tech-
nically, by itself, such consent has no legal validity; and,
3. The transplant must benefit the donor.
This "benefit" to the donor was in these three cases, as I as-
sume it must always be, of a psychological nature, that is, the
failure to make the donation and the resulting death of the recip-
ient would cause "grave, emotional impact" on the donor.
What would the Massachusetts Court do if the minor donor
is younger than fourteen? Should it make any difference that the
child is so young that he cannot understand the medical conse-
quences of the transplant? Should the understanding of the minor
be an essential element of proof where the Court finds that the
transplant would be beneficial to the donor and the parents have
consented to the procedure?2 4 Evidently the court thought so,
but the issue was not squarely presented to them.
I was recently informed of a case in Washington where a
county court authorized a skin transplant from a healthy three
23 Professor Curran in his article cited in note 22, supra, discusses at great
length this psychiatric testimony and points out that even though this type of
testimony may appear speculative, it has on several occasions been used to sup-
port rather monumental decisions. He gives as an example the famous school
segregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).24 Based primarily on the three unreported Massachusetts cases, Professor
William J .Curran and Dr. Hery K. Beecher, in a recent articlepublished in the
Journal of the American Medical Association, state that a minor donor in a trans-
plant situation should be at least fourteen years of age, with suficient intelligence
and maturity to understand the procedure. In cases involving donation of an organ
to a member of the immediate family, the authors suggest that the arbitrary age
level of fourteen be more flexible and that the age of seven would not be too
young if they were found cearly to understand the nature of the procedures
and the loss and risks to themselves involved." Curran & Beecher, Experimenta-
tion in Children, 10 J.A.M.A. 77, 83 (1969).
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year old twin to his badly burned brother.2 5 This is the only case
of which I am aware in which the donor was obviously too young
to meet the second criterion established by the Massachusetts
Court.
3. The Incompetent.
Prior to Strunk, there was no reported case in the United
States concerning whether an incompetent could donate part of
his body. Strunk was thus a case of first impression.2
6
With regard to medical treatment in general, the same basic
considerations applicable to minors have been held to apply to
incompetents. Thus, an incompetent cannot validly consent to a
medical procedure, but consent must come from the committee
or the person having the care, custody or control. The procedure
must also be of some benefit to the incompetent.27
With regard to transplants, the incompetent donor could be
compared to the minor donor, but there is one major difference.
It is quite possible to have a minor donor of sufficient intelli-
gence to understand the consequences of the proposed donation.
Such understanding, of course, would be impossible with the
incompetent.
B. The Deceased Donor.
The common law was never concerned with transplants of
organs from a cadaver and consequently is most unsuitable to
25 McMahon v. McMahon, Civ. No. 607074 (King County, Wash., August
20, 1963). The burned boy was brought to the Childrens Orthopedic Hospital
and Medical Center in Seattle with burns over forty per cent of his body. Fol-
lowing the courts authorization to proceed, a successful transplant was per-
formed. The burned boy recovered and the donor twin has suffered a minimum
of disfiguration. The case was not reported. Letter from Hon. Lucien F. Marion,
partner in the firm of Perkins, Coil, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Attorneys at Law,
Seattle, Washington, Nov. 27 1969. The case is discussed at length in Herron
& Marion, Homogra fing in the Treatment of Severe Burns, Using an Identical
Twin as a Skin Donor: Medical and Legal Aspects, 75 PAC. MED. & SuRGERY 4
(Jan.-Feb., 1967).2 6 1n the case of In re Edwin Troweridge Dickinson, in the probate court
for the District of Darien, Connecticut, that court, on November 4, 1960, author-
ized a kidney transplant from an incompetent to his sister. The court, after a full
hearing, found that the proposed donation would be for the psychological benefit
of the incompetent. This case was brought to my attention by Hon. Bruce Lank-
ford, attorney for the University of Kentucky, who was informed of its existence
by letter from Hon. Marvin L. Gruss, partner in the firm of Hawthorne, Ackerly
and Dorrance, Attorneys at Law, New Canaan, Connecticut.27 Williams v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 328 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1959).
1970]
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present medical need. In particular, two common law doctrines
restrict use of organs from cadavers. They are:
(1) The deceased cannot bequeath his body for medical
purposes; and
(2) The next of kin has control over the body and therefore
must consent to the removal of any organs.28
These two common law doctrines result in a ridiculous an-
omaly. A person, while alive, may donate a part of his body for
transplantation, but he has no legal way to effectuate the same
gift after his demise. Any donation after death can be made only
by the next of kin. To require the consent of the next of kin
severely limits the opportunity to obtain a needed organ. The
next of kin are usually the most bereaved and are easily offended
by such a request. The decision often must be made quickly
from the medical standpoint, yet the next of kin are seldom
prepared to make a quick decision. They may have religious
objections to a dismembering of the body, objections which may
or may not have been shared by the deceased prior to his death.29
Beyond the issue of consent, however, lies the far more crit-
ical issue in transplanting vital organs from a cadaver, namely
the exact time of death. Much has been written on this question,
medically and legally. 0
The problem, of course, is that if one is to donate an organ
necessary for his own life, he must be dead in order to do so.
There is therefore an inherent medical conflict in transplanting
from a cadaver. On the one hand, there is pressure from so-
ciety to extend for as long as possible the life" of a person
about to die. On the other hand, it is essential for a successful
transplant to remove the organ from the body as soon as possible
after death has been pronounced. For example, it has been
stated that kidneys ought to be transplanted no later than thirty
28 Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 13, at 395; 10 WM. & MARY L. REv.,
supra note 13, at 977-78.29 Finesilver, supra note 13, at 40. In this article, the writer speaks in terms of
the three religious doctrines of reincarnation, resurrection and resuscitation, and
points out that there probably would be little difficulty with next of kin who
follow the first two doctrines, but that those persons believing in resuscitation
are of the opinion that human bodies will be restored at some future time. This
would be incompatible with the donation of human organs.30 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 13, at 752; Sanders & Dukeminier, supra




minutes after "death." If not, post-mortem deterioration is ex-
cessive and they cannot be used.31
The problem is that death, biologically speaking, does not
occur at any one sudden moment. It is therefore extremely dif-
ficult to establish a criteria for fixing the time of death. Some
parts of the body may remain alive long after others have ceased
to function.
Most physicians have traditionally fixed death at the time
when the heart stops beating and circulation ceases.3 2 Other med-
ical personnel are beginning to argue that the time should not
be fixed at the time of cessation of heart beat, but at the time of
cessation of brain function, as indicated by the absence of waves
on an electroencephalogram.33 Of course, this does not offer an
easy solution because physicians have debated how long the
EEG brain wave should remain "fiat" before death should be
pronounced. Some feel this time could be as short as three or
four hours, while others feel it should be as long as twenty-four
to forty-eight hours.3 4
If doctors cannot agree on the criteria for establishing the
time of death, surely attorneys or judges should not be ex-
pected to do so. And legislators can only follow medical advice.
So in the final analysis, the medical profession will have to
establish these criteria.
Legal Implications Concerning the Recipient.
Of course, the recipient must also consent to the transplant.
Since he is the principal beneficiary, however, this consent is
seldom a problem. Even with a minor or an incompetent, the
guardian or parent, or committee or person having custody,
should be able to give consent with no necessity of court action.
The difficult legal problems with regard to the recipient arise
because of the scarcity of available organs for transplantation.
In this context, there are two sources available, the live donor
and the cadaver.
Concerning the live donor, the recipient has the burden of
finding a person who will be willing to give a part of his body.
3' Stickel, supra note 13, at 601.
32 Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 13, at 407.
33 Id. at 409.
34 Id. at 409-10.
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Of course, if the organ to be transplanted is necessary to sus-
tain the life of the donor, such as the heart, it would be illegal
to proceed with the transplant even with the donor's consent.
To do so would be homicide. Short of homicide, however, there
does not appear to be any reason why a donor could not give
a part of his body, even though it might have a substantial
adverse impact upon him. The real problem is finding a donor.
Usually the live donor is a member of the recipients immediate
family. No one else would be motivated to make such a gift.
But suppose the donation is not a gift at all, but a proposed
sale?35 Should this be illegal? If not, how should such an exchange
be taxed?30
A sale of organs might not be as preposterous a proposition
as it may first seem if one realizes that blood is often sold today
by blood "donors." Given the economics of supply and demand,
does it seem unlikely that a person with a fatal kidney disease
would want to purchase a kidney, and that a "down and out"
donor would want to make such a sale, for say, ten thousand
dollars?
If our society is going to permit such sales, will this create
one standard of medical care for the rich and one for the poor?
But has there not always been better medical care available for
those able to pay for it?
If the recipient is unable to find a live donor, he must find
a suitable cadaver. At present, the problem of which recipient is
to receive a given cadaver organ is determined by logistics and
medical criteria. The logistics factors exist because the recipient
must receive the organ quickly. Medical criteria exist because
the organ must be matched as to both blood type and tissue type.
Should there be medical advance, however, to the extent that
a cadaver organ can be transplanted in most any recipient re-
gardless of match, or, regardless of delay, these criteria will
35 on the sale of organs, see id. at 390. The authors cite an article in the
Lexington Herald-Leader, Jan. 19, 1968, § 1, at 14, col. 3, where a man in Mich-
igan offered to sell his heart for one million dollars. The writers point out that
such a removal of the heart would be homicide-but suppose the man had offered
to sell his kidney?
36 On taxation of organs for sale, see Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 13,
at 391-93. The authors point out that the tax consequences might include (1)
income tax consequences for the donor; (2) gift tax consequences to the donor,
if the gift is made to an individual; and (3) estate tax consequences, if the
organ is sold by the next of kin from a cadaver.
(Vol. 58
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vanish. They will be replaced, I suppose, only by the laws of
supply and demand. Many legal problems will need to be re-
solved at that point, some of which have already been referred
to. Can the next of kin sell the cadaver organ? If so, what are the
tax consequences both to the recipient and to the estate of the
deceased?
LEGAL REFoRm.
Law, as the most conservative of man's institutions, is usually
the last to respond to change. As Chief Justice Burger stated a
few years ago, "The law always lags behind the most advanced
thinking in every area. It must wait till the theologians and the
moral leaders and events have created some common ground,
and some consensus."37
With transplantation being a relatively new medical pro-
cedure, the law has not kept pace. There is very little case law
in this country. And while it is true that many states have en-
acted in the last twenty years or so statutes dealing with trans-
plantation in some manner, most of these statutes are wholly in-
adequate.
Recently however, several states have adopted statutes mod-
eled upon the recently drafted Uniform Anatomical Gift Act."'
Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, and approved by the American Medical As-
sociation and the American Bar Association, the Act is now
under consideration by many state legislatures.3 9 The Act prob-
ably will be adopted in nearly all of the states in the near future.
The Act is limited to ante-mortem gifts. It does not cover
either inter-vivos gifts or the usual problems related to bodies,
such as the authority to perform an autopsy or the leaving of a
body to a medical school. Most states already have statutes cover-
ing these problems.
The Act establishes who may make a donation, to whom it
may be made, and for what purpose. It defines the procedure
to be employed and allows revocation of the donation. Finally,
the Act provides that the treating physician must determine the
3 7 Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNLs oF INTmNAL ME _-
icnqE 17 (Supp. 7, Sept. 1967).38 See Appendix for full text. See also note 14, supra.
3 9 Wm. AND Mny L. REv., supra note 13, at 980.
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time of death and allows for immunity from civil liability if the
surgeon removes the organ while acting in good faith.
While a step in the right direction, the Act fails to provide
guidance for some very knotty legal problems, such as, whether
an organ may be sold, a definition of the time of death, and the
criteria to be used in selecting from several possible recipients
the one who will receive the organ.
In addition, the Act retains the basic presumption of the
common law that a person's body should not be disturbed with-
out the consent of the next of kin. Many writers are of the opinion
that, unless this basic presumption is changed, so that a cadaver's
organs may be freely used for transplantation unless there is an
objection, there will forever be a shortage of available organs.4 0
At present, then, there is little case law directly applicable to
transplants, and very little statutory law. We have a quagmire
of common law principals never intended to apply, and many
irrelevant statutes chiefly concerned with subjects such as au-
topsy, unclaimed bodies, donations of bodies to medical schools,
and coroner or medical examiner systems. While the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act will go far to remedy this situation, many
are of the opinion that the Act does not comprehensively deal
with the problems.
STRUNK v. STRUNK: TH-. FACTS41
At the time of the hearing, Arthur L. Strunk was fifty-four
years of age and his wife, Ava Strunk, fifty-two. They were
(and still are) long-time residents of Kentucky, presently
living in Williamstown. Their two living children, Tommy
40 Id. at 984; Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 13, at 410. Doctor Sanders
and Professor Dukeminier are of the opinion that the law% should be changed
from a "condition precedent of consent to a condition subsequent of objection." Id.
at 412.
But see Ford, supra note 11, at 139. Mr. Ford is in complete agreement
with the presumption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and disagrees with
what he calls the "fait accompli" theory proposed by Sanders and Dukeminier.
Ford feels this would result in a serious setback for transplantation because it
would convey the impression that the medical profession was "grubbing" for
organs.
41 All of the following facts are as reflected in the transcript of testimony
taken before Judge Robert Harrod of the Franklin County Court on August 19,
1969, In the Matter of Jerry Strunk, an Incompetent, upon petition filed on Au-
gust 5, 1969, in the Franklin County Court by the petitioner, Ava Strunk. This




Strunk and Jerry Strunk, were twenty-eight and twenty-six years
of age, respectively. Tommy Strunk had graduated from high
school, had attended Eastern Kentucky University for a while,
and was enrolled as a part-time student at the University of
Cincinnati where he was a dean's list student. He had been
married for seven years.
In 1962, Tommy was informed that he had a kidney ailment.
His condition slowly deteriorated to such an extent that in 1966
he was advised that his condition was critical and that he had
approximately three to five years to live. His condition was diag-
nosed as glomerulos nephritis, an inflammation of both kidneys
resulting in their destruction.
Beginning in 1969, Tommy was accepted as a patient for
treatment on the artificial kidney machine at the University of
Kentucky Medical Center at Lexington, Kentucky. This pro-
cedure is known as hemodialysis.
At the University of Kentucky Medical Center, as in hos-
pitals throughout the United States, there are approximately
five times as many persons in need of hemodialysis as receive it.
This places upon medical personnel the extremely difficult burden
of choosing among persons with fatal kidney disease those who
are to survive and those who must be left to die. With several
thousands of persons dying in the United States each year of
kidney disease who could be supported by hemodialysis, this is
a problem of fantastic proportions both medically and legally.42
At the time of the hearing on August 5, 1969, Tommy re-
quired hemodialysis one day out of every five, at a cost of five
hundred dollars per treatment. His kidney function was two to
three per cent of normal. Obviously hemodialysis was absolutely
necessary to keep Tommy alive.
Jerry Strunk, in 1953, was declared by the Harlan County
Court to be incompetent and was committed to the Kentucky
Training Home (now known at the Frankfort State Hospital
and School), Frankfort, Kentucky, an institution for the
42 See generally, Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 13. This is an extremely
comprehensive and well written article on this problem of selection of patients for
hemodialysis. The authors criticize the selection processes of some medical cen-
ters in choosing which persons are to receive hemodialysis where selection is made
upon an evaluation of social worth. The authors are particularly concerned with
those medical centers who make the selection by a secret or anonymous com-
mittee, and wonder what has happened to due process of law.
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mentally retarded. Jerry has an IQ of approximately 35, which
corresponds with the mental age of approximately six years.
He is further handicapped by a speech defect, which makes it
difficult for him to communicate with persons who are not well
acquainted with him. Although considered a ward of the state,
and under the state's custody and control, Jerry frequently is
allowed to go on extended vacations during the summer and
over Christmas holidays to his home in Williamstown.
Jerry is fully capable of dressing and feeding himself and
takes part in many of the activities offered at the Frankfort
State Hospital and School. Jerry's prognosis for recovery is, of
course, nil. He is mentally retarded and always will be, and
presumably will remain in the institution for the rest of his life.
He is, however, undergoing a rehabilitation and training program
there, and shows some progress.
The relationship between the two brothers over the years has
been extremely close. The testimony of Mrs. Strunk perhaps
best explains this relationship.
In the past years Tommy was the one that Jerry looked
to. I haven't [gone] to the school and picked up Jerry or took
him back for years, due to the fact that he insisted on Tommy
coming.., and taking him back.... Tommy has been the
one that has given Jerry any kind of normal life that Jerry
would hope to have had. He took him to drive-ins, showed
him how to ride horses, fish, and do all the things that a
normal boy could do.... You have to be there in the home
to have known of the devotion between these two boys
and the love that Tommy has for Jerry and Jerry has for
Tommy. Jerry looks up to Tommy; Tommy has been so
good to him. Jerry needs Tommy. He needs him in future
years because his father and I both have lived two-thirds of
our life out; my health is not real good. After we are gone,
the only living person who will be there will be Tommy to
go to the school and see about Jerry and take him out and
let him live a half-normal life and let him know what it is
outside of cold institution walls.43
Because of the enormous demand of patients for hemodialysis,
and because therapy on hemodialysis for an extended period of
43 Transcript, supra note 41, at 13-14.
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time was not indicated, the University of Kentucky Medical
Center advised Tommy that it was necessary for him to have a
kidney transplant. Tommy had the choice of using a kidney from
a cadaver, if and when one became available, or one from a live
donor if this was possible.
Concerning these two alternatives, the Director of the Renal
Division, University of Kentucky Medical Center, testified that
a live donor transplant in a suitably matched pair carries a much
better statistical outlook for both health and survival than a
cadaver transplant. With a well matched live donor, he testi-
fied, there was a ninety per cent chance that the kidney graft
would survive at the end of a two year period, as compared to
a forty per cent survival rate in a cadaver transplant. At the end
of this two year period, should there be a failure of the grafted
kidney, the patient could die, depending upon the various com-
plications which might arise, or it might be possible to graft
another kidney. In that event, the chances of success for the graft
and for the patient would be extremely poor.
Tommy's chances for a successful transplant were therefore
substantially increased if he could find a live donor. All mem-
bers of the Strunk family as well as distant relatives were tested
and found to be completely unsuitable for the transplant, with
the exception of Jerry. The medical testimony on this point was
quite clear. "If we do not use Jerry, there will be no other live
donor."44
Concerning the match from Jerry to Tommy, the testimony
was that this was an "A" match. There are four grades of match-
ing, from "A" to "D," "A being the best possible match. The
kidneys are matched both as to blood types and tissue type, the
better the match the less the tendency of rejection of the
transplanted kidney.
Concerning the risk to Jerry of donating a kidney, the doc-
tor explained that first there was the risk of an operation and
general anesthetic, which was "inevitable but very small," and
secondly, there was the risk to any patient who must live with
one kidney for the rest of his life.45 The testimony was that one
healthy kidney was more than enough to sustain a person through
44 Id. at 44.
45 ld. at 45.
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a normal life span, and that risk of damage or disease to the re-
maining kidney is extremely small. Based upon the some 2,500
kidney transplants performed to date, there have been no re-
ported fatalities in donors either during surgery or thereafter.
Further testimony revealed that insurance companies will accept
these people with one kidney at the same premium, so statis-
tically the risk of death is very small. "There are many people
born with only one kidney who live a very normal life and never
know anything about it."46
Concerning the procedure of the surgery, the testimony was
that Jerry would be hospitalized for about seven to ten days
during surgery and that thereafter he would be ambulatory for
approximately four to six weeks.
A real bomb was dropped in cross examination by the guard-
ian ad litem, who elicited testimony to the effect that should
something later happen to Jerry's remaining kidney, he probably
would not be able to undergo hemodialysis or be a candidate
for a transplant. Based upon the selection criteria of the Univer-
sity of Kentucky Medical Center, it was the judgment of the
witness that the transplant committee would not accept Jerry
for hemodialysis or transplant.47
While attempting to gather knowledge concerning Jerry's
ability to understand the proposed transplant, the University of
Kentucky Medical Center had Jerry examined by a psychiatrist,
who subsequently testified at the hearing. In view of the very
critical question of whether this transplant would be beneficial
to Jerry, this psychiatric testimony was of the utmost importance
and is quoted at length.
The doctor's diagnosis of Jerry was "mental retardation, mod-
erate to severe." The following is part of his testimony con-
cerning his examination.
Jerry was quiet and composed. There was no visible evidence
of anxiety, depression, elation, or hostility. Likewise I was
not able to elicit any evidence of delusions, hallucinations,
or bizarre thought content. He did not speak at all spontane-
46 d.
47Id. at 70. See Sanders & Dukeinier, supra, note 13, at 371, et seq. for a
discussion. of "socigl worth evaluation."
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ously but gave a quick, staccato like response to all ques-
tions. His verbal responses were characterized by monotone
with a nasal quality. There was some difflculty understanding
some of the responses.
Jerry gave his age as 14. With some prompting from his
mother he was able to say that he was now in Lexington. He
was not able to name the month or the year but correctly
selected July when given a choice of June, July or August.
He stated that two plus two equals three and three plus three
equals four. He was able to correctly name a penny, nickle,
and dime. He said that it took three nickles to make a dime.
He stated that these objects were used to buy cigarettes. He
identified his favorite cigarette as being 'just like daddy's.'
He was not able to name the President of the United States,
but was able to identify the late President Kennedy as some-
one who was Wkiled in the heart.'
Jerry give his brother Tommy's age as 55 (correct 28) and
states that he likes his brother. He says that he knows his
brother is sick and identifies the sickness as 'kidney.' He
understands that an issue at hand is to 'give kidney' to help
Tommy. He says that Tommy's kidney would be put in the
garbage can. He says the operation would hurt and that he
might have to be in the hospital two weeks.48
The psychiatrist further testified:
I think he understands about as much as I was able to de-
scribe in the paragraph above. I believe he does understand
that the giving of a kidney is a helpful or is intended to be
a helpful act because of his brother's ill health.4 9
The psychiatrist did not believe that Jerry had sufficient
understanding to give an informed consent such as an average
person would give. He did feel, however, that Jerry understood
some of the procedure. While the given IQ for Jerry at the hos-
pital was 30, the doctor testified that in his opinion the estimate
was a bit low and that his IQ could be as high as 50.
In response to the critical question of what would be the effect
4 8 Transcript, supra note 41, at 74-75.
49Id. at 76.
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on Jerry if the proposed transplant were not approved and Tom-
my subsequently died, the psychiatrist stated, "I believe he would
be saddened by this more or less in the same manner as some-
one who had normal mentality."50 He further testified that in
his opinion Jerry
... has sufficient understanding of his brother's illness and
how he, Jerry, might help his brother, and that he has suf-
ficient emotional capacity to be saddened by the death of
his brother and the degree of intellectual function to estab-
lish some connection. . . I do not believe that he could
understand it in quite the degree that we could, but he would
have some understanding. 51
Upon cross examination, in response to the question of
whether Tommy's death, in the absence of a transplant from
Jerry, would have a long-range effect upon Jerry, the doctor
replied:
I don't think I could in all honesty make a long-range pre-
diction. I think he has a normal positive feeling toward his
brother. How much and how long he would carry with him
a reaction to his brother's death is difficult to assess without
Jerry being able to communicate better....
I believe that he would have some guilt feelings in this. As
to how long they would last or how long they would be
carried in his mind over a period of years, I could not say.52
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Mental
Health, as custodian for Jerry, was extremely interested in the
case, and a representative of the Department testified at the
hearing. This testimony was that the Department is charged
with the responsibility for Jerry's welfare, that it considered
Jerry's family ties a vital part of his treatment and rehabilitation,
and that, therefore, it would be important that the close re-
lationship existing between the two brothers be continued. Thus,
the Department argued that the proposed transplant would di-
50 Id. at 77.




rectly benefit Jerry because it offered the best opportunity for
Tommy's survival.5 3
STRUNK v. STRUNK: THE PROCEDURE
Upon the advice of their legal counsel, the University of
Kentucky Medical Center refused to proceed with the transplant
on the ground that Jerry was not capable of giving an informed,
voluntary consent. Although informed that his parents were pre-
pared to give such consent, the Medical Center still refused to
proceed for the reason that Jerry was not a minor and parental
consent was therefore meaningless.
My initial solution for the dilemma which faced the Strunk
family was to have Mrs. Strunk appointed committee for her
incompetent son, Jerry, and then have Mrs. Strnk, as committee,
sign the consent form on his behalf. The Medical Center, how-
ever, again upon advice of counsel, took the position that a
transplant involving an incompetent donor went far beyond
the usual procedures for incompetents, and therefore, even with
the consent of the committee, they requested that the committee
obtain some type of court order authorizing the transplant.
It thus became necessary to file suit. But who would sue
whom and in what court? There were no reported cases in
Kentucky, or for that matter in the United States, upon which
to rely as precedent. Finally, the conclusion was reached that the
mother, who was now committee for Jerry, would file a petition
in the county court of Franklin County, which was Jerry's resi-
dence since he was institutionalized there. This petition would
ask the court to authorize the committee to consent to the trans-
plant.
Filed on August 5, 1969, the petition requested the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of the
incompetent, and an order
... authorizing and empowering the petitioner, as commit-
tee for the said incompetent, to consent to the donation of a
kidney by the said incompetent, Jerry Strunk, to his brother,
Tommy Strunk, and to consent on behalf of the said incom-
53 Id. at 113.
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petent, Jerry Strunk, to all medical and surgical actions and
procedures which may be required in the performance of
the kidney transplant operation.54
The guardian ad litem filed an answer alleging that such a
procedure would not be in the best interests of the incompetent,
but would be detrimental to his health and well being, that it
would violate the rights guaranteed the incompetent under the
Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of Kentucky, and that the court was without power
to force an incompetent to undergo compulsory medical treat-
ment, when such treatment was not necessary for the preserva-
tion of the incompetent's life or his continued health and well
being.
The case was heard before Judge Robert Harrod of the
Franklin County Court, on August 19, 1969. At that time the
testimony previously mentioned was introduced. At the conclu-
sion of the hearing the court asked for briefs by all parties con-
cerned: the attorney for the petitioner, the guardian ad litem,
and the attorney for the Department of Mental Health, as
amicus curiae.
The basic questions and the arguments presented in the
briefs were:
1. Whether the county court or a circuit court had juris-
diction.
Kentucky law requires the committee of an incompetent to
be appointed in the county court of the residence of the incom-
petent, and further provides that the county court shall have
"the exclusive jurisdiction of the appointment and accounting of
committees." (Emphasis added.) 5
There was no case law establishing jurisdiction in the county
court on a case such as this, but neither was there any law pro-
hibiting it. My contention was that "accounting" should be given
broad construction, so that the term would include not just ac-
tuarial reporting but a general responsibility of the committee to
report to and be governed by the county court.
54 Copies of the petition are on file in Franklin Circuit Court, Frankfort, Ken-
tkysrsKRS § 387.210(1) (1942).
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2. Whether the county court, given jurisdiction, had au-
thority to order the relief sought.
The committee argued that the court did have such authority
for two reasons. The first was based on Kentucky statutes and
the second on common law.
Kentucky statutes provide that the committee shall be re-
sponsible for the "necessary and proper maintenance" of the in-
competent.50 Case law interpreting these statutes was scarce
and confusing. In Williams v. First National Bank and Trust
Company of Lexington,57 the Court of Appeals held that the
committee, as opposed to the incompetent's spouse had the legal
right to choose the physician to care for the incompetent's med-
ical needs. And in Makenson v. Commonwealth,8 the Court held
that the committee had the responsibility of caring for the "per-
son" as well as the property of the incompetent.
However, in Baker v. Thomas,59 the Court had previously
stated that the Kentucky statute "does not contemplate that the
committee . . . may exercise any other power than to have the
possession, care, and management of the . . . incompetent's
estate." 0 Actually, in Baker the committee was attempting to
adopt children for the incompetent and the case did not involve
medical treatment for the incompetent. Nevertheless, the
language is there.
The committee's position, then, was based upon Williams and
Makenson, that the committee had authority to consent to the
transplant as part of the committee's responsibility to care for
the person of the incompetent. This put squarely into issue the
question of whether the transplant would really benefit the
incompetent. Baker, I was prepared to argue if cited, was not in
point on its facts and would become ridiculous if applied to a
medical procedure. If Baker were the law, a committee couldn't
even authorize the giving of an aspirin.
Secondly, the committee argued that the court had inherent
power, even absent any statutory authority, to authorize this
transplant on the ground that the court stood in the position of
56KRS § 387.230(1) (1942); KRS § 387.060 (1942).
57328 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1959).




parens patriae and should have authority to order any medical
procedure which would be beneficial to the incompetent. Au-
thorities cited for this proposition were the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases such as State v. Perricone,61 where the court exercised its
power in the interests of the health of a minor and ordered a
blood transfusion against the wishes of the parents.
3. Whether the transplant would be beneficial to Jerry.
The real issue, then, after jurisdiction and authority to act,
was the one of benefit. We frankly conceded that the court
should not grant the relief sought unless the transplant would be
beneficial to Jerry. As the main evidence on this issue, the psychi-
atric testimony was crucial. We argued that this testimony proved
the benefit.
4. Whether the transplant would violate any constitutional
rights.
The guardian ad litem argued that the removal of Jerry's
kidney without his understanding or consent would violate his
right to be secure in his person, his right to due process, and his
right to equal protection under the law.
We argued that his right to due process and equal protec-
tion were protected by a full hearing, with representation of a
guardian ad litem, upon adequate notice, and that, in any event,
if his rights were to be violated at all, it would not be by his
giving of the kidney, but by the court's refusal to allow him to
give it, based upon the testimony that his donation would be
beneficial to him.
On September 9, 1969, the Franklin County Court issued an
order finding that "it would be psychologically beneficial and in
the best interest of the incompetent" to donate the kidney, and
the committee was authorized to consent. The guardian ad litem
appealed de novo to the Franklin Circuit Court, and the case
was advanced on the docket.
On September 12, 1969, the Franklin Circuit Court affirmed
and adopted the findings of fact of the county court. The guardian
ad litem appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and the case
was advanced on the docket and heard in oral argument before
the entire Court.
6137 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1960).
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On September 26, 1969, the Court of Appeals, by a four to
three vote, affirmed. Both a majority and dissenting opinion
were published.0
STRUNK v. STRUNK: THE HOLDNG
The majority opinion, after a recitation of the pertinent facts,
rejected our first contention that the committee had authority to
consent based upon statutes.
Review of our case law leads us to believe that the power
given to a committee under KRS 387.230 would not extend
so far as to allow a committee to subject his ward to the
serious surgical techniques there under consideration unless
the life of his ward be in jeopardy.6
But the Court then accepted our second contention by stating
that a chancery court, absent any statutory authority, does have
sufficient power, under the doctrine of "substituted judgment"
to authorize the transplant. The Court pointed out that this doc-
trine of substituted judgment is based upon the English com-
mon law concept that the Crown delegated to the chancery
courts the right as parens patriae to interfere in particular cases
for the benefit of such persons as are incapable of protecting
themselves. The Court, under the doctrine, may substitute its
judgment for the person who is incapable of making a judgment
for himself. 4 The court cited an old English case65 as authority
for this doctrine in English law, and a New York case 6 as au-
thority for the doctrine in this country. 7
Because the Franklin Circuit Court, a chancery court, had
found that the operative procedures were in the best interests of
Jerry Strunk, the Court, after reviewing all the facts, and par-
ticularly the psychiatric testimony and the position of the De-
partment of Mental Health, found that this finding was based
upon substantial evidence, and therefore affirmed.
02 Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (1969).
63 Id. at 149.
64 27 AM. Jtr. 2D Equity § 69 (1966) was cited by the Court as authority
for this proposition.0 Ex parte Whitebread 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
661n the Matter of Willoughby, a Lunatic, 11 Paige 257 (N.Y. 1844).
67See Annot, 24 A.L.R. 3d 863 (1969), for a discussion of this doctrine.
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The dissenting opinion,68 citing Baker v. Thomas,69 first
stated that Kentucky statutes regarding the power of a com-
mittee "do nothing more than give the committee the power to
take custody of the incompetent and the possession, care, and
management of his property." It did not mention Williams7 ° or
Makenson,71 the later cases interpreting these statutes as giving
the committee power to make medical decisions concerning the
"person" of the incompetent. But this is not the real crux of the
dissent in any event, because the majority also felt that these
statutes did apply in this case.
Without mentioning by name the doctrine of substituted
judgment upon which the decision of the majority rested, the
dissent seemed to reject the doctrine by asserting, "The ability
to fully understand and consent is a prerequisite to the dona-
tion of a part of the human body."72
The dissent then apparently shifted its position, stating that
the evidence in this case was insufficient to "conslusively demon-
strate" a "significant benefit" to the incompetent, but that if the
evidence ever did rise to that "pinnacle," the transplant should be
allowed. Concerning the evidence, the dissenters were bothered
by the psychiatric testimony, which was "most nebulous," and
by the testimony that a cadaver kidney could be used.
The Court apparently was unconcerned by the constitutional
questions raised by the guardian ad litem. Nowhere were these
issues discussed in either the majority or dissenting opinions. In
short, then, the decision was based entirely on Kentucky's com-
mon law doctrine of substituted judgment.
STRUNK v. STRUNK: THE Furtun
On October 14, 1969 surgeons at the University of Ken-
tucky Medical Center removed a kidney from Jerry Strunk and
placed it in his brother Tommy. The transplant was a complete
success. Jerry made a quick recovery and was soon released from
the hospital. He has now returned to his previous level of ac-
tivities and is, at the time of the writing of this article, en-
68 445 S.W.2d at 149.
69272 Ky. 605, 114 S.W.2d 1113 (1938).
70 Williams v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 328 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1959).
71Makenson v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 634, 167 S.W.2d 313 (1942).
72445 S.W.2d at 150.
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joying the Christmas holidays in the home of his parents. Tommy
has also done remarkably well. He was released about four
weeks after surgery, with an excellent prognosis. He and his
wife are also spending Christmas in the Strunk home.
For this family, Strunk v. Strunk was much more than a seven
page decision in the South Western Reporter. For Tommy, it
meant a vastly improved chance for life. For Arthur and Ava
Strunk, it was the happy and satisfying end to a long and some-
times bitter struggle to aid one stricken son and at the same time
make life more meaningful for a second. For Jerry, it was the
one opportunity in a life of dependence to be of real service to
a person he loved. And, what is of perhaps the greatest sig-
nificance of all, the case is now a matter of history and this family
can once again return to the wonderful business of living.
But for those of us in the legal profession charged with the
awesome responsibility of leading a society constantly searching
for justice, Strunk v. Strunk is not merely history. It is the be-
ginning.
In its narrowest construction, Strunk holds that a person in-
capable of understanding the procedures may donate a part of his
body for transplantation. This is the first reported case so holding
in the United States. The decision will obviously have an impact
on future cases involving transplants from incompetents or minors
too young to understand or consent.
In its broadest construction, Strunk holds that a court of
equity has the enormous power to make whatever orders it may
deem necessary for the benefit of those not capable of looking
after themselves. The case is the most recent and probably the
most dramatic example of the doctrine of substituted judgment
in this country. I think it is this latter construction that frightened
the dissenting judges. It is this kind of power, which, if un-
checked, could indeed lead to abuse of individual liberty. "The
liberty of a man's person is more precious to him than all the
rest that follow."73
The possible ramifications of Strunk are endless. It is inter-
esting to ponder in what context Strunk may next be applied.
Perhaps, as in the Washington county court case, a child of
tender years will be a prospective skin donor to a burned brother
73E. COME, SECOND INsTrUTE 46.
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or sister. Perhaps an incompetent like Jerry Strunk will be a pros-
pective donor for a family member who, instead of caring for
the incompetent, neglected him. Perhaps a committee will re-
quest that its incompetent be sterilized because she is incapable
of caring for children, or because it is likely her children will
also be retarded. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has already
discussed this possibility without deciding the question. 4
But however Strunk may be applied, and no matter what re-
sults may be reached in the future, I am convinced that justice
was done in this case. And that, after all, is what it's all about.
APPENDIX
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
An Act authorizing the gift of all or part of a human body
after death for specified purposes.
SECTION 1. [Definitions.]
(a) "Bank or storage facility" means a facility licensed,
accredited, or approved under the laws of any state for storage
of human bodies or parts thereof.
(b) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes
a stillborn infant or fetus.
(c) "Donor" means an individual who makes a gift of all
or part of his body.
(d) "Hospital" means a hospital licensed, accredited, or
approved under the laws of any state; includes a hospital
operated by the United States government, a state, or a sub-
division thereof, although not required to be licensed under
state laws.
(e) "Part" means organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood,
other fluids and any other portions of a human body.
(f) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government
or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership or association, or any other legal entity.
(g) "Physician" or "surgeon" means a physician or surgeon
licensed or authorized to practice under the laws of any state.
74 Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580 (Ky. 1968).
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(h) "State" includes any state, district, commonwealth,
territory, insular possession, and any other area subject to the
legislative authority of the United States of America.
SECTION 2. [Persons Who May Execute an Anatomical Gift.]
(a) Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or
more may give all or any part of his body for any purpose
specified in Section 3, the gift to take effect upon death.
(b) Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated,
when persons in prior classes are not available at the time of
death, and in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications
by the decedent or actual notice of opposition by a member of
the same or a prior class, may give all or any part of the
decedents body for any purpose specified in Section 3:
(1) the spouse,
(2) an adult son or daughter,
(3) either parent,
(4) an adult brother or sister,
(5) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the
time of his death,
(6) any other person authorized or under obligation to
dispose of the body.
(c) If the donee has actual notice of contrary indications
by the decedent or that a gift by a member of a class is opposed
by a member of the same or a prior class, the donee shall not
accept the gift. The person authorized by subsection (b) may
make the gift after or immediately before death.
(d) A gift of all or part of a body authorizes any examina-
tion necessary to assume medical acceptability of the gift for
the purposes intended.
(e) The rights of the donee created by the gift are
paramount to the rights of others except as provided by Section
7(d).
SECTION 3. [Persons Who May Become Donees; Purposes for
Which Anatomical Gifts May be Made.] The following persons
may become donees of gifts of bodies or parts thereof for the
purposes stated:
(1) any hospital, surgeon, or physician, for medical or
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dental education, research, advancement of medical or dental
science, therapy, or transplantation; or
(2) any accredited medical or dental school, college or
university for education, research, advancement of medical or
dental science, or therapy; or
(3) any bank or storage facility, for medical or dental
education, research, advancement of medical or dental science,
therapy or transplantation; or
(4) any specified individual for therapy or transplantation
needed by him.
SEMCTON 4. [Manner of Executing Anatomical Gifts.]
(a) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2 (a)
may be made by will. The gift becomes effective upon the
death of the testator without waiting for probate. If the will is
not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary pur-
poses, the gift to the extent that it has been acted upon in good
faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A gift of all or part of the body under Section 2 (a)
may also be made by document other than a will. The gift
becomes effective upon the death of the donor. The document,
which may be a card designed to be carried on the person,
must be signed by the donor in the presence of 2 witnesses who
must sign the document in his presence. If the donor cannot
sign, the document may be signed for him at his direction and
in his presence in the presence of 2 witnesses who must sign the
document in his presence. Delivery of the document of gift
during the donor's lifetime is not necessary to make the gift
valid.
(c) The gift may be made to a specified donee or without
specifying a donee. If the latter, the gift may be accepted by
the attending physician as donee upon or following death. If
the gift is made to a specified donee who is not available at
the time and place of death, the attending physician upon or
following death, in the absence of any expressed indication
that the donor desired otherwise, may accept the gift as donee.
The physician who becomes a donee under this subsection shall




(d) Notwithstanding Section 7 (b), the donor may desig-
nate in his will, card, or other document of gift the surgeon or
physician to carry out the appropriate procedures. In the
absence of a designation or if the designee is not available, the
donee or other person authorized to accept the gift may employ
or authorize any surgeon or physician for the purpose.
(e) Any gift by a person designated in Section 2 (b) shall
be made by a document signed by him or made by his tele-
graphic, recorded telephonic, or other recorded message.
SECTION 5. [Delivery of Document of Gift.] If the gift is
made by the donor to a specified donee, the will, card, or other
document, or an executed copy thereof, may be delivered to
the donee to expedite the appropriate procedures immediately
after death. Delivery is not necessary to the validity of the
gift. The will, card, or other document, or an executed copy
thereof, may be deposited in any hospital, bank or storage
facility or registry office that accepts it for safekeeping or for
facilitation of procedures after death. On request of any
interested party upon or after the donor's death, the person in
possession shall produce the document for examination.
SECTION 6. [Amendment or Revocation of the Gift.]
(a) If the will, card, or other document or executed copy
thereof, has been delivered to a specified donee, the donor may
amend or revoke the gift by:
(1) the execution and delivery to the donee of a signed
statement, or
(2) an oral statement made in the presence of 2 persons
and communicated to the donee, or
(3) a statement during a terminal illness or injury
addressed to an attending physician and communicated to the
donee, or
(4) a signed card or document found on his person or
in his effects.
(b) Any document of gift which has not been delivered
to the donee may be revoked by the donor in the manner set
out in subsection (a), or by destruction, cancellation, or mutila-
tion of the document and all executed copies thereof.
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(c) Any gift made by a will may also be amended or
revoked in the manner provided for amendment or revocation
of wills, or as provided in subsection (a).
SECTION 7. [Rights and Duties at Death.]
(a) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee
accepts a gift of the entire body, he may, subject to the terms
of the gift, authorize embalming and the use of the body in
funeral services. If the gift is of a part of the body, the donee,
upon the death of the donor and prior to embalming, shall
cause the part to be removed without unnecessary mutilation.
After removal of the part, custody of the remainder of the
body vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin, or other persons
under obligation to dispose of the body.
(b) The time of death shall be determined by a physician
who tends the donor at his death, or, if none, the physician who
certifies the death. The physician shall not participate in the
procedures for removing or transplanting a part.
(c) A person who acts in good faith in accord with the
terms of this Act or with the anatomical gift laws of another
state [or a foreign country] is not liable for damages in any
civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding
for his act.
(d) The provisions of this Act are subject to the laws of
this state prescribing powers and duties with respect to autopsies.
SECTION 8. [Uniformity of Interpretation.] This Act shall be
so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the laws of those states which enact it.
SECTION 9. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited the as the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
SECTION 10. [Repeal.] The following acts and parts of acts
are repealed:
SECTION 11. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take
effect....
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